Why Did A 10 Year U.S. Counterinsurgency Program Fail In Mali

Mali Insurgency Followed 10 Years Of U.S. Counterterrorism Programs -- Walter Pincus, Washington Post

What went wrong with the counterterrorism efforts the State and Defense departments ran in Mali for 10 years?

French troops are moving against Islamist fighters who’ve traveled south from northern Mali. The White House or Congress, or both, should examine why the U.S. programs targeting the groups failed.

It’s worth understanding, since the United States is trying similar efforts in other nations.

In November 2002, the State Department announced that officials from its Office of Counterterrorism had visited Mali and other West African countries to brief governments on the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which was “designed to protect borders . . . combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability.”

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My Comment: Will anyone be held accountable for this fiasco .... probably not. Did intelligence fail in assessing the situation in Mali .... definitely. Will there be changes in U.S. policy and strategy in other countries that use the same Mali training template that has so obviously failed .... I hope so. Will the White House reverse their position from a few months ago during the campaign when they stated that Al Qaeda "was on the run" and/or that Al Qaeda is “decimated,” “on the path to defeat” .... LOL .... yeah right .... they are going to be veerrryyy quiet on this one.

Vietnam's Counter-Insurgency Lessons Are Being Forgotten In Afghanistan

Steven Greimann, a senior civilian representative with the U.S. Agency for International Development, snaps a photo of a deep well in a tobacco field during Operation Southern Strike III in the Spin Boldak district of Afghanistan's Kandahar province, Sept. 6, 2012. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Brendan Mackie

Viewpoint: Counter-Insurgency Lessons From Vietnam -- David Donovan, BBC

The rise in so-called insider attacks by rogue Afghan security forces has highlighted the perils of joint operations in counter-insurgency. But former US soldier David Donovan, who fought in Vietnam, says lessons learnt long ago have been forgotten.

If you could feel the heat and sweat of the tropics. If you could hear the noise of battle and sense the fears.

If you could put yourself on the other side of the world where you are the selectee of your government to advise and help a unit of foreign fighters defend their village.

And if you and that unit are at this moment in combat but they are being slow to react, you might come close to understanding how I felt one day in 1969 in the Mekong delta of Vietnam.

The enemy were in a nearby tree-line. They had taken us under fire, and bullets were cutting leaves from the trees.

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My Comment: Those who ignore the past are doomed to repeat it .... and if David Donovan's analysis is correct .... we are repeating them in Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine And The Global Jihad -- A Commentary

On patrol: Afghan soldiers out and about in the wake of protests that cclaimed the life of a Nato soldier. Photo from The Daily Mail

From The American Thinker:

There have been some phony arguments put forth for another "surge" in Afghanistan. We need not a surge of troops, we merely need to let our forces there do what needs to be done - kill the enemy.

There is this misconception about Afghanistan in particular (and Islam in general) that somehow we can bring Central Asia (and the rest of the Islamic world) kicking and screaming into the 21st Century through good will. This is simply not the case. There is no amount of money to spend, infrastructure to build, schools to provide, hospitals to heal, or good will that Americans can display toward the Afghan people that will produce a lasting effect. I was once told by an accomplished Afghan intelligence analyst that, "you can rent an Afghan, but you can't buy him."

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My Comment: A blunt and a "no holds barred" commentary on the wars that we are fighting, and a description of the culture where this battle is being fought.

Written by a retired Marine, he gives a picture of what he has seen and experienced in these countries. Warning .... he holds no punches.

The Ethics Of Counterinsurgency -- A Commentary

US troops on patrol (U.S. Army)

From The New Atlantis:

The term “irregular warfare” has become a catch-all label for those forms of warfare that are neither conventional (that is, involving the land, sea, and air forces of belligerent states using traditional tactics) nor nuclear. It applies to both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare; it also applies to counter-terrorist and “direct action” missions of special forces and to stabilization, training, and reconstruction operations. The U.S. military efforts today in Iraq and Afghanistan are decidedly examples of irregular warfare; so was much of the Vietnam War. And it is likely that the United States will be involved in more irregular conflicts in the years ahead. As the most recent iteration of the U.S. National Defense Strategy puts it:

U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.

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My Comment: This is a long and comprehensive article on the topic of counterinsurgency warfare, but it is a must read for those who are interested and focused on this topic.

Brew a cup of coffee, and take the time to read this work by Keith Pavlischek .... you will not be disappointed.

Can Modern America Wage A Counterinsurgency Campaign?

From The Scholar's Page:

Lt. General David Barno, the former commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, gave testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 26. His testimony is not small (30 pages in PDF form) but is an essential read for those concerned with the future of American efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. While much in the testimony was brilliant, one particular section of his report prompted an immediate double take; for the first time since I began my education in geopolitics I find myself seriously doubting America's ability to win the war she is waging.

The passage of note is a time table for the implementation of the strategy General Barno outlines throughout his testimony. Below is an excerpt, in which I have taken the liberty to highlight phrases whose implications have given me cause for alarm:

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My Comment: My excuse is that my time is limited with other projects (which it is), but this is a post that I wish I had written. It is a must read.